Deep Water research

UK France Germany Electricity Mix 2024

Compare the electricity generated in the United Kingdom, France and Germany during 2024. How did nuclear, wind, solar and fossil generation shares differ, and how do net electricity imports change the interpretation of each country's carbon intensity? Reconcile disagreements between public primary datasets, keep units and accounting boundaries explicit, and distinguish generation-based from consumption-based measures. Make the full report easy to digest: use source-supported charts for useful numerical comparisons, explain the main finding before the detail in each passage, and keep material caveats beside the figures they qualify.

Sep 25, 202639 sources reviewed

Executive Summary

  • Scale and mix differed sharply in 2024: France generated about 539.0 TWh [15]. This included 361.7 TWh nuclear and only 20.0 TWh fossil, of which 17.4 TWh was gas and 0.7 TWh coal plus 1.8 TWh oil [15]. Renewables reached a record 150.0 TWh or 27.8% of generation [15]. The United Kingdom was much smaller and more fossil- and wind-dependent, with wind at a record 83.3 TWh or 29.2% [6]. Fossil was at a record low of 31.8%, with gas at 30.4% narrowly ahead of wind [6]. Germany generated 501.2 TWh gross and 479.1 TWh net after 22.0 TWh power-plant self-consumption [11].

  • Trade reverses first impressions of cleanliness: France was a very large net exporter at 89.0 TWh, equivalent to 16.5% of output, including 20.1 TWh net to Great Britain and 22.3 TWh net to Italy [16]. Germany was a net importer, reported as 31.9 TWh on a commercial basis and 26.3 TWh as a physical primary-energy surplus [5][11]. Great Britain imported heavily including a record 9 TWh in Q1 [13].

  • Consumption-based carbon intensity therefore moves opposite to domestic mix: consumption-based intensity accounts for cross-border exchanges whereas production-based intensity considers only domestic generation [1]. France's consumption-based intensity exceeds its production-based intensity by an annual mean of 5 t CO2/GWh despite only 7.5% fossil in domestic generation, because it exports clean power and imports from more fossil-reliant neighbours [1]. Germany's consumption-based intensity is lower than its production-based intensity, in part because it imports nuclear power from France [1].

  • Disagreements are mainly boundary effects, not errors: DUKES separates generation from supply after excluding generation use and on-site consumption, with supply plus imports matching demand [4]. AGEB separates 501.2 TWh gross from 479.1 TWh net and 527.4 TWh gross domestic consumption from 471.0 TWh net consumption after pumps and losses [11]. Ember reports monthly net generation but annual gross generation, and conversion may introduce error [9].

  • Recommendation: use national official totals for single-country accounting — DUKES Table 5.6 for the UK [2][4], RTE Annual Review for France [15], and AGEB plus SMARD for Germany with commercial versus physical trade kept separate [5][11] — and use Ember or ENTSO-E only for harmonised cross-country or flow comparisons with gross-net, provisional-data and solar-adjustment caveats stated alongside [8][9].

1. Total generation volumes and nuclear, wind, solar and fossil shares in 2024

Main finding: France was the largest generator and overwhelmingly nuclear plus low-carbon, the UK was wind- plus gas-led with fossil at a record low, and Germany's evidence supports gross-net totals and selected fuels but not a complete 2024 fuel-share table.

Country, 2024 Total generation as reported Nuclear Wind Solar Fossil and gas detail
United Kingdom No single 2024 total TWh is directly quoted in the cited spans; DUKES splits 2024 into 229.0 TWh from Major Power Producers and 55.9 TWh from autogenerators and other generators, with MPPs at 80.4% [4] 2025 was 35.9 TWh, down 12% from 2024 to the lowest since the 1980s, at 12.2% of 2025 generation, down 2.0 points from 2024 [2] Record 83.3 TWh in 2024 at 29.2% of total [6]; 2025 was 86.4 TWh, up 3.4% on 2024, at 29.5% of total [2] 2025 was 20.1 TWh, up 34.2% to the highest on the series, at 6.9%, up 1.6 points from 2024 [2] Fossil at record low 31.8% in 2024 with coal stopping completely in September 2024 [6]; gas 30.4% in 2024, narrowly ahead of wind as the primary source [6]; 2025 fossil was 94.9 TWh, up 4.1% but still historically low, at 32.3%, up 0.4 points from the 2024 record low, almost all gas at 93.2 TWh and 31.8% [2]
France, RTE official 539.0 TWh, highest for five years [15] 361.7 TWh after low 279.0 TWh in 2022 and recovery in 2023 [15] Wind plus solar 71.6 TWh in 2024, versus 45.8 TWh in 2019 [15] 24.8 TWh, for the first time above fossil generation [15] Fossil 20.0 TWh, lowest since early 1950s [15]; gas 17.4 TWh versus 29.2 TWh in 2023; coal 0.7 TWh and oil 1.8 TWh remained very low [15]; low-carbon nuclear plus renewables reached 95% for the first time [15]; renewables record 150.0 TWh or 27.8% [15]
France, Enerdata secondary 536.5 TWh, highest in 5 years [7] 361.7 TWh, i.e. 67% of mix [7] 47 TWh [7] 23 TWh [7]; wind plus solar 70 TWh or 13% [7] Fossil 19.9 TWh, lowest since early 1950s and below solar [7]
Germany Gross 501.2 TWh less 22.0 TWh self-consumption equals 479.1 TWh net [11] No 2024 nuclear TWh in cited evidence — gap stated explicitly No complete 2024 wind TWh in cited evidence — gap stated explicitly; 2025 wind was 132 TWh, 3.2% lower than prior year on poorer conditions [10] No complete 2024 solar TWh in cited evidence — gap stated explicitly; 2025 PV was about 87 TWh, about 15 TWh or 21% more than prior year [10] Hard coal for public supply was 24.3 TWh in 2024, rising to 26.7 TWh in 2025; lignite fell by 3.9 TWh to 67.2 TWh in 2025 [10]; gas in 2025 was 52.4 TWh net for public supply plus 26.1 TWh industrial self-consumption, 3.7 TWh above prior year [10]; biogenic sources about 49 TWh including 43.5 TWh solid, liquid and gaseous biomass [11]

The UK renewable total illustrates a unit caveat beside the figure: total renewable generation in 2024 is published as a record 143.7 GWh with 5.1% growth on 2023 [6].

The GWh label is evidently inconsistent with TWh-scale wind alone at 83.3 TWh [6] and with 2025 renewables at 153.0 TWh, up 5.9% from 2024 at 52.1%, up 1.6 points [2].

The UK detail also includes 2023 context [3]:

  • 292.7 TWh total, down 9.9% on 2022 [3]
  • nuclear 40.6 TWh at 13.9% [3]
  • wind record 82.3 TWh at 28.1% [3]
  • solar record 13.9 TWh at 4.7% [3]
  • fossil 107.3 TWh at record-low 36.7% [3]
  • gas 101.7 TWh at 34.7% [3]
  • coal record-low 3.8 TWh at 1.3% [3]
  • renewables record 135.8 TWh at 46.4% [3]
  • low-carbon nuclear plus renewables 60.3% [3]
  • bioenergy 34.1 TWh at 11.6% [3]

France's two totals differ by 2.5 TWh and its wind-plus-solar by 1.6 TWh between RTE and Enerdata, while solar differs by 1.8 TWh and fossil by 0.1 TWh [7][15]. That pattern points to definitional and vintage differences rather than a different physical system, discussed in Section 5.

Germany's 2024 mix cannot be closed from the cited evidence into nuclear, wind, solar and fossil shares on a common gross or net basis. The evidence supports gross-net levels [11], hard-coal public-supply output [10], and biogenic output including waste-split conventions [11], but wind, solar and fossil totals for 2024 on the same boundary are not quoted. Reporting a full German share table would require estimation, which is avoided here.

2. How accounting boundaries and definitions change reported generation

Main finding: gross versus net, mainland versus national, commercial versus physical, and thermal-loss versus primary-electricity conventions each move the headline by TWh.

Boundary choice What changes UK illustration France illustration Germany illustration
Generation versus supply versus demand Generation measures what is generated while supply excludes generation use and on-site consumption; supply plus imports matches demand; final consumption excludes generation, transmission and distribution losses while total demand is larger because it includes generation use and losses [4] MPP versus autogenerator split matters because MPPs were 229.0 TWh and others 55.9 TWh, MPP share 80.4% [4] RTE trade analysis uses Great Britain rather than the United Kingdom because Northern Ireland is in the integrated Ireland/Northern Ireland market [16] Gross 501.2 TWh versus net 479.1 TWh after 22.0 TWh self-consumption; gross domestic consumption 527.4 TWh versus net consumption 471.0 TWh after 8.3 TWh pump use and 26.1 TWh grid losses and unrecorded factors [11]
Gross versus net generation Thermal self-consumption and own use lower net below gross; Ember factors are for net and are adjusted by 6% for thermal and 1% for others when reporting gross [9] DUKES reports fuel use, generation and supply separately by fuel in Tables 5.3 and 5.6, allowing gas, coal and oil splits rather than a single fossil total [4] éCO2mix records PSH pumping as consumption and PSH turbines as generation from discharged water, and splits hydro into run-of-river and locks, lakes/reservoirs/dams and PSH turbines [12] Photovoltaic production includes both grid feed-in and on-site in-house consumption [11]; natural-gas input is split into 505 PJ for electricity including small CHP under 1 MW and 185 PJ for CHP heat [11]
Geographic coverage Mainland-only versus island-inclusive totals differ DUKES is a UK balance; GB-only ESO or interconnector data exclude Northern Ireland's different market coupling [4][16] éCO2mix covers mainland France, excluding Corsica [12] SMARD commercial foreign trade at 67.0 TWh imports and 35.1 TWh exports [5] differs from AGEB physical surplus of 26.3 TWh or 95 PJ counted in primary energy with plus 0.9 points consumption effect [11]
Fuel and technology grouping Waste, CHP heat, biomethane and de-rating shift fuel shares CHP counts only fuel share for electricity, with contracted heat reported separately under heat; 79% of CHP outputs were qualifying, about two-thirds heat; qualifying electricity was 7.3% of total generation in 2024 [4] éCO2mix shows nuclear, gas, coal, fuel oil, hydro, wind, solar and bioenergy; bioenergy includes waste-to-energy partly non-renewable; gas splits into turbines, cogeneration, CCGT and other; fuel-oil into combustion turbines, cogeneration and other; bioenergy into biogas, solid biofuels and waste; solar is total PV fleets plus scattered units; wind splits onshore and offshore [12] Mineral oil covers crude, fuels, heating oil, petroleum coke, LPG, refinery gas and other products; hard coal covers raw coal, briquettes and coke; lignite covers raw lignite, briquettes, other products and hard lignite; domestic trash in waste plants is split equally regenerative and non-regenerative; biomethane in the gas grid is recorded under renewables not natural gas [11]
Energy-unit and efficiency convention Same electricity can show very different primary energy DUKES uses tonne of oil equivalent as common unit for comparing and aggregating fuels [4]; for wind, hydro and solar fuel is assumed equal to electricity with no conversion losses, unlike thermal, which is why total fuel for generation fell to 44.7 Mtoe in 2024 as non-thermal grew [4]; thermal renewables operate around 35-40% versus around 48% for gas [4]; about 73% of renewable fuels are for electricity with about a third lost in conversion [4] No separate French efficiency-method span in evidence; low-carbon share is generation-based at 95% [15] AGEB uses the internationally used efficiency method whereas Germany formerly used substitution, changing primary-energy level and trend [11]; hydro, wind and PV assume 100% conversion while biogenic fuels use actual content, so PV input at 267 PJ appears 29% below biomass including biogenic waste at 377 PJ though PV electricity output was 52% higher [11]; gas is on heating value while calorific value is about 10% higher; primary consumption is dual-reported as 10,529 PJ equal to 359.2 Mtce; hard-coal imports use generalised 7,000 kcal/kg ignoring actual values to give almost 27 Mtce [11]
Capacity versus energy De-rated capacity understates variable-renewable nameplate Total de-rated capacity was 71.7 GW in 2024, with 26.8 GW de-rated renewables and 36.3 GW fossil after Ratcliffe-on-Soar closure; wind, small hydro and solar PV are de-rated for intermittency while Table 5.12 holds non-de-rated installed capacity [4] No 2024 de-rated capacity span in evidence No equivalent 2024 de-rated span in evidence

Two renewable-share denominators are easily confused. DUKES renewable-electricity share for gross final consumption excludes generation ultimately consumed in transport, so it differs from generation and supply shares, while overall renewables were 16.2% of gross final consumption in 2024 on a different denominator with the largest contribution from renewable electricity [4].

3. Net electricity imports, exports and interconnector flows in 2024

Main finding: France was the region's large clean exporter, Germany flipped to a sizable net importer, and Great Britain set import records — but GB is not the UK, and commercial trade is not physical flow.

Country and boundary Imports 2024 Exports 2024 Net 2024 Key bilateral and context, with caveat beside figure
Germany, SMARD commercial foreign trade 67.0 TWh, up 23.2% from 54.3 TWh [5] 35.1 TWh, down 10.1% [5] Net importer 31.9 TWh, up from 15.3 TWh in 2023 [5] France largest source: import 15,691.9 GWh from France, export 2,852.2 GWh to France [5]; Austria largest export destination: export 9,162.0 GWh, import 1,747.4 GWh [5]; Belgium export 1,779.1 GWh, import 4,515.8 GWh; Czechia export 4,729.5 GWh, import 1,932.9 GWh; Denmark 1 export 2,159.2 GWh, import 11,022.5 GWh; Denmark 2 export 974.6 GWh, import 4,063.2 GWh; Netherlands export 3,841.1 GWh, import 6,341.8 GWh; Norway export 1,227.7 GWh, import 7,042.9 GWh; Poland export 5,109.8 GWh, import 1,604.3 GWh; Sweden export 386.5 GWh, import 2,992.7 GWh; Switzerland export 2,805.4 GWh, import 9,872.6 GWh [5]
Germany, AGEB physical primary-energy balance Implicit in surplus Implicit in surplus 26.3 TWh or 95 PJ more inflow than outflow, with plus 0.9 points consumption-enhancing effect on primary consumption [11] Differs from SMARD 31.9 TWh because commercial scheduled trade and physical measured exchange plus statistical territory differ; do not subtract one from the other [5][11]
Germany, RTE cross-check — — Net importer 28 TWh in 2024, 22 TWh in 2025, tilted to imports since 2023 [16] Sits between SMARD and AGEB; useful as directional confirmation, not as replacement for German official balance [16]
France, RTE physical 4.1 TWh from Germany plus Belgium [16] 31.3 TWh to Germany plus Belgium [16]; total exports equivalent to 16.5% of output in 2024 [16] Net export 89.0 TWh [16] Core Germany-plus-Belgium net 27.2 TWh, second highest ever [16]; Great Britain net 20.1 TWh, then a record beaten later [16]; Italy net 22.3 TWh, then beaten by later 26.2 TWh [16]; transit through France similar to 11 TWh in 2025 [16]; capacity context: new 1,200 MW France-Italy link in 2023 and higher France-GB capacity from IFA 2 in 2021 and ElecLink in 2022 [16]
Great Britain, ESO via NIAUK On track to nearly 36 TWh over whole 2024 [13] Not quoted Q1 net 9 TWh record [13]; Jan-May net 14.95 TWh [13]; net imports 15% of GB power Jan-May, enough for 10.8 million homes [13]; June highest ever imported share 19% [13] Previous annual record 24.6 TWh in 2021 [13]; National Grid operates six interconnectors with nuclear from France the leading import source [13]; net imports from France to UK totalled 12.7 TWh last year per government data, with timing ambiguous in the span [13]; Norway second largest exporter mainly hydro [13]; interconnectors send to higher-price countries such as the UK in summer, raising UK imports [13]; GB excludes Northern Ireland, so GB imports do not equal UK imports [16]
Germany commercial electricity trade, 2024

Imports exceeded exports on the SMARD commercial boundary; net importer 31.9 TWh. Commercial trade differs from physical flow.

Germany commercial electricity trade, 2024016.7533.550.2567TWhImportsImports: 67 TWh [5]67ExportsExports: 35.1 TWh [5]35.1
Data and sources
Imports67 TWh [5]
Exports35.1 TWh [5]

Physical versus commercial is material. éCO2mix imports and exports are physical flows measured at interconnectors [12], while SMARD is explicitly commercial foreign trade [5]. Transit also matters: flows passing through France were similar in scale to 11 TWh [16], so bilateral commercial schedules and border-metered physical flows need not match country net balances.

4. Generation-based versus consumption-based carbon intensities in 2024

Main finding: trade makes France look slightly dirtier on consumption than on production and Germany slightly cleaner, even though France generates far less fossil power domestically.

Consumption-based intensity accounts for cross-border exchanges, whereas production-based intensity considers only domestic generation [1]. That single sentence governs interpretation: a net exporter effectively shares its domestic mix with neighbours, while a net importer inherits part of neighbours' mixes.

France illustrates the exporter penalty. Despite only 7.5% of domestic generation from fossil fuels, its consumption-based intensity exceeds its production-based intensity by an annual mean of 5 t CO2/GWh [1]. The mechanism is that France exports significant clean electricity to the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Italy and others while also importing from neighbours, many more fossil-reliant, with cited fossil shares of 62.0%, 68.9%, 89.1%, 32.8%, 43.4% and 56.2% for interconnected UK, ES, LU, BE, DE and IT respectively [1]. Those neighbour percentages should be read as dataset-context illustration in ECON-PowerCI, not as 2024 official national fossil shares, because the UK illustration at 62.0% is far above the UK 2024 record-low fossil share of 31.8% [6] and the 2025 DUKES fossil share of 32.3% [2].

Germany illustrates the importer benefit. With relatively high fossil reliance for production, it imports nuclear power from France, and as a major exporter within the EU its consumption-based intensity is lower than its production-based intensity [1]. The exporter wording reflects the dataset's period characterisation; in 2024 Germany was a net importer on both SMARD commercial and AGEB physical measures [5][11], which strengthens rather than weakens the direction that imports lower consumption intensity when imports are cleaner than marginal domestic fossil output.

No absolute gCO2 per kWh levels for 2024 are quoted in the cited evidence, only the France delta of 5 t CO2/GWh, equivalent to 5 gCO2 per kWh on a unit-consistent basis but stated here only in the source's t CO2/GWh units to avoid introducing a converted headline [1]. The evidence therefore supports direction and France's mean gap, not a ranked league table of national intensities.

Measure France 2024 logic Germany 2024 logic UK 2024 logic from trade context
Generation-based Very low fossil at 20.0 TWh including 17.4 TWh gas [15], or 19.9 TWh below solar in secondary reporting [7]; 95% low-carbon [15] Higher fossil reliance than France [1]; gross 501.2 TWh versus net 479.1 TWh boundary shifts fossil intensity per delivered unit [11] Fossil record low 31.8% with gas 30.4% [6]; wind 29.2% [6]
Consumption-based Higher than production by 5 t CO2/GWh mean because clean exports leave a relatively more fossil import residual [1] Lower than production because French nuclear imports dilute domestic fossil [1] Net importer status — Q1 9 TWh, Jan-May 14.95 TWh at 15%, June 19% [13] — means consumption mix includes French nuclear and Norwegian hydro alongside domestic gas and wind [13]; no consumption-production delta quoted in evidence, so direction is inferred from trade, not observed

5. Why Ember, ENTSO-E, IEA and national statistics disagree and which source is most reliable

Main finding: use national sources for levels, ENTSO-E for transparent physical flows, and Ember for speedy harmonised comparison — and never mix their vintages or gross-net bases without adjustment.

Source family What it actually publishes Why it diverges on 2024 Reliability guidance for this question
UK DUKES Commodity balances in fuel-specific units converted to tonne of oil equivalent for aggregation [4]; generation, fuel use and supply by fuel in Tables 5.3 and 5.6 [4]; Charts 5.3 and 5.4 by fuel 2000-2024 or 2025 [2][4] Provisional versus final, MPP versus autogenerator coverage, CHP qualifying versus total, and wind-hydro-solar treated as fuel equals electricity with no thermal losses [4] Most reliable for UK totals and UK fuel splits; cite Table 5.6 vintage explicitly because 2025, 2024 and 2023 chapters revise prior years [2][3][4]
France RTE 539.0 TWh total, 361.7 TWh nuclear, 71.6 TWh wind-plus-solar with 24.8 TWh solar, 150.0 TWh renewables at 27.8%, 20.0 TWh fossil [15] Mainland France excluding Corsica in éCO2mix [12]; PSH pumping versus turbine accounting [12]; bioenergy including partly non-renewable waste [12]; secondary aggregators may use different vintage or grouping, hence Enerdata 536.5 TWh total, 47 TWh wind, 23 TWh solar and 19.9 TWh fossil [7] Most reliable for France levels; prefer RTE 539.0 TWh family over secondary 536.5 TWh unless the secondary grouping is explicitly needed [15][7]
Germany AGEB, SMARD, Fraunhofer AGEB gross 501.2 TWh, net 479.1 TWh, pump and loss deductions, PV including on-site use, waste split and biomethane rules [11]; SMARD commercial imports 67.0 TWh, exports 35.1 TWh, net 31.9 TWh with bilateral GWh detail [5]; Fraunhofer hard-coal 24.3 TWh in 2024 for public supply [10] Efficiency versus former substitution method for primary energy [11]; heating versus calorific value about 10% gap for gas [11]; commercial versus physical trade; public-supply versus industrial self-consumption, e.g. gas 52.4 TWh public plus 26.1 TWh industrial in 2025 [10] Most reliable for Germany, but keep commercial trade, physical balance and public-supply generation separate; do not use Fraunhofer 2025 changes to back-cast unquoted 2024 wind or solar levels [10]
ENTSO-E Transparency Platform Mandatory submission and publication under Regulation 543/2013 of 14 June 2013, launched 5 January 2015, collected from TSOs, exchanges or qualified third parties, detailed in Data Descriptions and Manual of Procedures, with 2011-2014 history in Data Pre-5.1.15 [8] Terminology, methodology and reported data show inconsistencies at all levels across sources [14]; documented representativity scaling for hourly load is neither the value derived from monthly consumption nor constant, and using it may underestimate German peak demand by up to a quarter [14] Best for transparent border-metered flows and methodology audit, but not a plug-and-play national total without scaling and vintage checks [8][14]
Ember European Electricity Review Annual 1990-2022 gross primarily Eurostat with wind from IRENA; 2023 estimated gross by applying absolute monthly net changes to gross baseline; net imports 1990-2022 Eurostat with recent estimated similarly; monthly from ENTSO-E plus national TSOs; lagged months estimated from prior-year relatives and flagged; monthly often provisional and imperfect with multi-source checks [9] Reports monthly net but annual gross in the EU, conversion may introduce error; emission factors for net adjusted 6% thermal and 1% others for gross; solar adjusted where incomplete including Germany with unusually low growth and Austria, Czechia, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden; France monthly from ENTSO-E; Germany gas and solar from Energy-Charts, other fuels Agora, flows ENTSO-E, yearly gas Energy Institute; emissions calculations improving but may be conservative or uncertain [9] Best for timely like-for-like cross-country direction, but state gross-net conversion error, provisional status and solar adjustments beside any 2024 figure; German wind-solar can differ 10-20% by source [9][14]
IEA No 2024 IEA generation, trade or intensity spans in the cited evidence Cannot be assessed from evidence Do not cite IEA for 2024 levels in this report; evidence is thin and any IEA figure would be unsourced here

A concrete reconciliation checklist follows from the above:

  • First, align year and vintage: UK 2023 at 292.7 TWh [3], UK 2025 at 293.6 TWh up 2.6% on 2024 [2], and UK 2024 wind at 83.3 TWh [6] come from different vintages and should not be differenced as if final.

  • Second, align geography: France-GB balances [16] and GB import records [13] exclude Northern Ireland by market design [16].

  • Third, align trade concept: SMARD commercial net 31.9 TWh [5], AGEB physical surplus 26.3 TWh [11], and RTE Germany importer 28 TWh [16] are three valid answers to three different questions.

  • Fourth, align generation concept: AGEB net 479.1 TWh after self-consumption [11], DUKES supply after generation use and on-site use [4], and Ember monthly net versus annual gross [9] shift both totals and carbon per GWh.

Germany 2024 net imports under three trade concepts

Three valid answers to different questions: commercial schedules, physical balance and RTE cross-check. Do not subtract one from another.

Germany 2024 net imports under three trade concepts07.97515.9523.92531.9TWhSMARD commercial netSMARD commercial net: 31.9 TWh [5]31.9AGEB physical net inf…AGEB physical net inflow: 26.3 TWh [11]26.3RTE cross-check netRTE cross-check net: 28 TWh [16]28
Data and sources
SMARD commercial net31.9 TWh [5]
AGEB physical net inflow26.3 TWh [11]
RTE cross-check net28 TWh [16]

Limitations / Open Questions

  • Incomplete German 2024 fuel table: the evidence does not quote 2024 German nuclear, wind, solar and fossil generation on one consistent gross or net boundary, so Section 1 reports gross-net totals, hard-coal public-supply output and biogenic output only [10][11]. Any full share comparison would require additional official AGEB Table or BMWK/DESTATIS vintage.
  • No absolute carbon intensities: only the France consumption-minus-production gap of 5 t CO2/GWh and the definitional distinction are quoted [1]. Absolute 2024 gCO2 per kWh on generation versus consumption bases, and UK deltas, cannot be stated without inventing factors.
  • French 2.5 TWh total gap unresolved: RTE 539.0 TWh [15] versus Enerdata 536.5 TWh [7] with offsetting wind-solar and fossil gaps is noted but not fully explained by the spans; mainland-excluding-Corsica coverage [12], PSH treatment [12], vintage, and renewable grouping including waste partly non-renewable [12] are plausible contributors requiring source-table audit.
  • UK 2024 total not directly quoted: DUKES gives the 2024 MPP plus other split and MPP share [4], 2024 wind, fossil and gas shares [6], and 2025 levels plus point changes from 2024 [2], but no single 2024 TWh total span. Summing components or back-casting from growth rates is avoided here as estimation.
  • Trade timing and GB-UK mapping: the France-to-UK 12.7 TWh last-year figure lacks a clear reference year in the span [13], and GB records [13] cannot be equated to UK balances [4] because RTE treats Great Britain separately from Northern Ireland [16]. The 2024 whole-year GB import pace near 36 TWh is an on-track projection in the span, not an outturn [13].
  • IEA and ENTSO-E 2024 outturns missing: no IEA 2024 spans are provided, and ENTSO-E spans describe the Transparency Platform's mandate, collection and history [8] rather than 2024 TWh values. Cross-source German wind-solar variability of 10-20% [14] and Ember provisional, flagged estimation and solar adjustments [9] mean any harmonised 2024 ranking needs explicit uncertainty.

Sources

[1] A near-real time daily European Power Consumption and Carbon Intensity Dataset (ECON-PowerCI) — https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-025-05978-7?error=cookies_not_supported&code=f5133986-9bd5-44f6-bea3-db866807bdad · academic [2] Chapter 5: Electricity — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6a6a35c50ddb7e4831c629ed/DUKES_2026_Chapter_5.pdf · government [3] Chapter 5: Electricity — https://cdn.threerivers.gov.uk/files/2024/09/be7d62e0-798e-11ef-ba8e-ed267910e33d-I43-DESNZ-DUKES_2024_Chapter_5.pdf · government [4] DUKES 2025 Chapter 1-7 — https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68dbe477ef1c2f72bc1e4c4d/DUKES_2025_Chapters_1-7.pdf · government [5] SMARD | Evaluation of last year — https://www.smard.de/page/en/topic-article/5892/215704/evaluation-of-last-year · government [6] UK Renewable Electricity Hits Historic 50% Milestone in 2024 — https://www.climateaction.org/news/uk-renewable-electricity-hits-historic-50-milestone-in-2024 · professional [7] Nuclear and renewables raised France's 2024 power generation to 5-year high — https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/nuclear-and-renewables-raised-frances-2024-power-generation-5-year-high.html · professional [8] Electricity Market Transparency — https://www.entsoe.eu/data/transparency-platform/ · professional [9] European Electricity Review 2024 | Ember — https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/european-electricity-review-2024/supporting-materials/ · professional [10] German Public Electricity Generation in 2025: Wind and Solar Power Take the Lead For the First Time - Fraunhofer ISE — https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/en/press-media/press-releases/2026/german-public-electricity-generation-in-2025-wind-and-solar-power-take-the-lead.html · professional [11] Energy Consumption in Germany 2024 — https://ag-energiebilanzen.de/wp-content/uploads/AGEB_Jahresbericht2024_20250815_en.pdf · professional [12] éCO2mix - Power generation by energy source — https://www.rte-france.com/en/data-publications/eco2mix/power-generation-energy-source · general [13] UK Power Imports Hit Record — https://www.niauk.org/uk-power-imports-hit-record/ · general [14] How much Electricity do we Consume? A Guide to German and European Electricity Consumption and Generation Data — https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/feemcl/230596.html · general [15] French Annual Electricity Review 2024 — https://analysesetdonnees.rte-france.com/en/annual-review-2024/keyfindings · general [16] 2025 Review - Trade | Analysis and Data — https://analysesetdonnees.rte-france.com/en/annual-review-2025/trade · general

Source quality: 1 academic, 4 government, 6 professional, 5 general.

Verification

  • France 2024 generation unsupported: 539.0 TWh total, 361.7 TWh nuclear, wind plus solar 71.6 TWh, solar 24.8 TWh, renewables 150.0 TWh at 27.8%, fossil 20.0 TWh with gas 17.4 TWh coal 0.7 TWh oil 1.8 TWh, 95% low-carbon, and Enerdata secondary 536.5 TWh with 47 TWh wind 23 TWh solar 19.9 TWh fossil have no evidence card.
  • United Kingdom mix incomplete and largely unsupported beyond wind: fossil 31.8% with gas 30.4%, coal closure, DUKES 229.0 TWh Major Power Producers plus 55.9 TWh autogenerators at 80.4%, 2025 and 2023 levels, renewable 143.7 GWh unit label, bioenergy and low-carbon shares have no evidence card; only wind record 83.3 TWh at 29.2% is supported.
  • Germany 2024 fuel comparison gap: gross 501.2 TWh less 22.0 TWh self-consumption equals 479.1 TWh net, gross domestic consumption 527.4 TWh versus net 471.0 TWh, hard-coal lignite gas biogenic and PV figures, and absence of 2024 nuclear wind solar fossil on a common boundary have no evidence card, so requested nuclear wind solar fossil shares cannot be compared.
  • Net electricity trade balances unsupported: France net export 89.0 TWh at 16.5% including 20.1 TWh to Great Britain and 22.3 TWh to Italy and 27.2 TWh to Germany plus Belgium, Germany SMARD commercial 67.0 TWh imports 35.1 TWh exports net 31.9 TWh with bilateral GWh list, AGEB physical 26.3 TWh or 95 PJ, and RTE cross-check 28 TWh have no evidence card; both report-visual bar charts built on 67.0 35.1 and 31.9 26.3 28 TWh are therefore unsupported.
  • Carbon-intensity interpretation unsupported: definition that consumption-based accounts for exchanges while production-based is domestic only, France consumption exceeds production by mean 5 t CO2/GWh despite 7.5% fossil, neighbour fossil shares 62.0% 68.9% 89.1% 32.8% 43.4% 56.2%, and Germany lower on consumption via French nuclear imports have no evidence card; no absolute 2024 gCO2 per kWh levels are evidenced.
  • Accounting-boundary and reconciliation claims largely unsupported: DUKES generation versus supply, CHP qualifying, tonne of oil equivalent and efficiency conventions, AGEB pump 8.3 TWh losses 26.1 TWh waste-split biomethane and heating versus calorific value, Ember monthly net versus annual gross with 6% thermal 1% other conversion and solar adjustments, ENTSO-E Regulation 543/2013 mandate, and IEA absence have no evidence card; only eco2mix mainland France excluding Corsica, nuclear gas coal fuel-oil hydro wind solar bioenergy categories with wind onshore offshore split, terminology methodology data inconsistencies at all levels, German wind-solar 10-20% source differences, and representativity factor not constant with up to one-quarter peak underestimation in Germany are supported.
  • Reliability recommendation and checklist are opinion without evidence: use DUKES Table 5.6 for UK, RTE Annual Review for France, AGEB plus SMARD with commercial versus physical kept separate for Germany, and Ember or ENTSO-E only for harmonised comparison is not verified by evidence cards.
  • Great Britain versus United Kingdom and timing gap remains: supported import facts are Q1 9 TWh record, Jan-May 14.95 TWh at 15% for 10.8 million homes, on-track nearly 36 TWh over 2024, prior 24.6 TWh in 2021, June 19% share, six interconnectors, France leading nuclear source, Norway second hydro, price-driven summer flows; France to UK 12.7 TWh last year timing, GB to UK mapping, and whole-year 36 TWh projection versus outturn are still ambiguous.